Bayesian repeated games and reputation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.05.014MaRDI QIDQ900408zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antoine Salomon, Françoise Forges

Publication date 22 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.014

zbMATH Keywords

discountingincomplete informationpublic goodrepeated gamereputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• Reputation in repeated games with no discounting
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• Bayesian learning in repeated games
• Reputation in continuous-time games
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Reputation and the flow of information in repeated games
• Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games
• Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players

Cites work

• A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
• Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
• Game theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099353 (Why is no real title available?)
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs
• Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study
• Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
• Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
• Sowing doubt optimally in two-person repeated games
• The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration
• The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides

Cited in

(9)

• Reputation in repeated games with no discounting
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
• Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• Stochastic Control Approach to Reputation Games
• Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
• Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games

This page was built for publication: Bayesian repeated games and reputation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q900408)