Capacitated network design games
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5764884 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038734 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Algorithms, games, and the internet
- Avoiding the Braess paradox in non-cooperative networks
- Capacity allocation under noncooperative routing
- Congestion games with linearly independent paths: convergence time and price of anarchy
- Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects
- Efficient graph topologies in network routing games
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
- Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games.
- Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
- On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
- Optimal cost sharing for resource selection games
- Potential games
- Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
- Strong equilibrium in congestion games
- Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
- Strong price of anarchy
- The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
- The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
- The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
- Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks
- Worst-case equilibria
- Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
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