Direct reciprocity in structured populations

DOI10.1073/PNAS.1206694109MaRDI QIDQ2962140zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Matthijs van Veelen, Julián Garcia, David G. Rand, Martin A. Nowaka

Publication date 16 February 2017

Published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1206694109

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

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Cites work

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• Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
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• Robustness against indirect invasions
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• The evolution of cooperation
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The importance of being discrete (and spatial)
• Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

Cited in

(58)

• The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups
• Evolutionary games and matching rules
• Sequential interactions -- in which one player plays first and another responds -- promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games
• Assortment and the evolution of cooperation in a Moran process with exponential fitness
• Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
• Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions
• The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types
• Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking
• Density games
• Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
• Constraints on reciprocity for non-sessile organisms
• Global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration
• Ranking game on networks: the evolution of hierarchical society
• Eco-evolutionary spatial dynamics of nonlinear social dilemmas
• The impact of expressing willingness to cooperate on cooperation in public goods game
• When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation?
• Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
• Direct reciprocity on graphs
• Direct reciprocity and model-predictive strategy update explain the network reciprocity observed in socioeconomic networks
• Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Evolving cooperation in spatial population with punishment by using PSO algorithm
• Indirect reciprocity with optional games and monitoring of interactions between defectors
• Evolutionary multiplayer games
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
• Hamilton's rule
• The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
• Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games
• Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint
• In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs
• Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
• The evolution of generalized reciprocity in social interaction networks
• A game-theoretical dynamic imitation model on networks
• Evolution of cooperation through aspiration-based adjustment of interaction range in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Direct reciprocity-based cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks
• Hidden patterns of reciprocity
• The mechanics of stochastic slowdown in evolutionary games
• Group-level events are catalysts in the evolution of cooperation
• Quantifying the impact of noise on macroscopic organization of cooperation in spatial games
• Limit cycles sparked by mutation in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
• Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection
• Evolution and the ultimatum game
• Cooperation driven by alike interactions in presence of social viscosity
• The impact of anxiety on cooperative behavior: a network evolutionary game theory approach
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• To catch a stag: identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games
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• The impact of feedbacks on evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations
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• Social norms and cooperation in higher-order networks
• Evolution of cooperation among fairness-seeking agents in spatial public goods game
• Analysis of cooperative stability for reputation evaluation rules in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• The evolution of reputation-based cooperation in regular networks
• Games among relatives revisited
• The evolutionary advantage of limited network knowledge
• Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
• Evil green beards: tag recognition can also be used to withhold cooperation in structured populations
• In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.

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