Entity usage

This page lists pages that use the given entity (e.g. Q42). The list is sorted by descending page ID, so that newer pages are listed first.

Showing below up to 50 results in range #1 to #50.

Cost-reducing technologies and labor supply in a Krugman-type model where consumption is time-constrained: some new results: Label: en
On the relation between private information and non-fundamental volatility: Label: en
Choosing sides in a two-sided matching market: Label: en
The weak hybrid equilibria of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents and externalities: Label: en
Inter-league competition and the optimal broadcasting revenue-sharing rule: Label: en
On iterated Nash bargaining solutions: Label: en
Risk aversion and uniqueness of equilibrium in economies with two goods and arbitrary endowments: Label: en
Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values: Label: en
An urban configuration with online competition: Label: en
The R\&D investment decision game with product differentiation: Label: en
Software cracking and degrees of software protection: Label: en
Collusion, shading, and optimal organization design: Label: en
A note on a moment inequality: Label: en
Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) certification and endogenous market structure: Label: en
The strategic adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility with network externalities: Label: en
How the future shapes consumption with time-inconsistent preferences: Label: en
Product quality and product compatibility in network industries: Label: en
A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale: Label: en
Product differentiation and trade: Label: en
Financial and operational creditors in bankruptcy resolution: a general equilibrium approach under three game-theoretic division rules with an application to India: Label: en
Management centrality in sequential bargaining: implications for strategic delegation, welfare, and stakeholder conflict: Label: en
Technology adoption under negative external effects: Label: en
Transfers and resilience in economic networks: Label: en
Quality, shelf life, and demand uncertainty: Label: en
Screening with privacy on (im)persistency: Label: en
Equilibrium pricing under concave advertising costs: Label: en
Optimality of a linear decision rule in discrete time AK model: Label: en
Data and competitive markets: some notes on competition, concentration and welfare: Label: en
Step by step innovation without mutually exclusive patenting: implications for the inverted U: Label: en
Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity: Label: en
Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance: Label: en
A dynamic graph model of strategy learning for predicting human behavior in repeated games: Label: en
Constrained persuasion with private information: Label: en
Redistributive unemployment benefit and taxation: Label: en
The effects of introducing advertising in pay TV: a model of asymmetric competition between pay TV and free TV: Label: en
Quality competition and market-share leadership in network industries: Label: en
Insufficient entry and consumer search: Label: en
Social efficiency of entry in a vertical structure with third degree price discrimination: Label: en
Family ties and corruption: Label: en
Arrowian social equilibrium: indecisiveness, influence and rational social choices under majority rule: Label: en
Uninformed bidding in sequential auctions: Label: en
Management turnover, strategic ambiguity and supply incentives: Label: en
Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard: Label: en
Cobb-Douglas preferences and pollution in a bilateral oligopoly market: Label: en
Duty to read vs duty to disclose fine print. Does the market structure matter?: Label: en
Endogenous expectations management with network effects: a note: Label: en
A note on the existence of the competitive equilibrium in Grosssman and Shapiro (1984): Label: en
On an ``important principle of Arrow and Debreu: Label: en
Injurers versus victims: (a)symmetric reactions to symmetric risks: Label: en
Politically connected firms and the environment: Label: en