Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
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Recommendations
- Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions
- Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- On Repeated Games with Complete Information
Cited in
(30)- Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Nash equilibrium strategies in repeated games with and without cost of implementation
- Sowing doubt optimally in two-person repeated games
- Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
- Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
- Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
- Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device
- A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
- Internal correlation in repeated games
- Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
- Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
- What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
- The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
- Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
- Repeated games with endogenous choice of information mechanisms
- Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
- Limit equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games
- Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions
- Repeated games with complete information
- Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
- Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
- Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
- Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games
- General properties of long-run supergames
- A folk theorem for minority games
- Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
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