A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90073-QzbMath0764.90013MaRDI QIDQ1183700

John V. Howard

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game of perfect informationgeneralized Nash bargaining solutionunique perfect equilibrium outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (23)

Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games ⋮ A STOCHASTIC BARGAINING PROCESS AND CORRESPONDING ONE-SHOT SOLUTION CONCEPT ⋮ Nash implementation and the bargaining problem ⋮ Random extensive form games ⋮ Reasonable Nash demand games ⋮ Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution ⋮ Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions: comment ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: a simple Nash program ⋮ Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat ⋮ Recursive and bargaining values ⋮ Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees ⋮ On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules ⋮ A note on implementation of bargaining solutions ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions ⋮ On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games ⋮ Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases ⋮ Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game ⋮ An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations ⋮ Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions. ⋮ Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• Implementation via backward induction
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The Bargaining Problem
• Probabilistic Social Choice Based on Simple Voting Comparisons
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Efficient, Anonymous, and Neutral Group Decision Procedures
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Implicit Intransitivity Under Majority Rule with Mixed Motions
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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