Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.008zbMath1347.91179OpenAlexW1756357714WikidataQ65553889 ScholiaQ65553889MaRDI QIDQ5964694

José R. Correa, Felipe Balmaceda, Santiago R. Balseiro, Nicolás E. Stier-Moses

Publication date: 1 March 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.008

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardprincipal-agent problemlimited liabilityprice of anarchywelfare loss

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (2)

Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty ⋮ Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?

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