Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.004zbMath1239.91016OpenAlexW2096480188MaRDI QIDQ423741

Pedro Jara-Moroni

Publication date: 4 June 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10533/130661

zbMATH Keywords

rational expectationseductive stabilityexpectational coordinationnon-atomic gamesrationalizable strategiesstrong rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (8)

Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization ⋮ Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games ⋮ On the space of players in idealized limit games ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ Rationalizability in large games ⋮ Rationalizability and mixed strategies in large games ⋮ Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a Walrasian auctioneer

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