Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0523-0zbMath1278.91083MaRDI QIDQ656802

Duygu Yengin

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0523-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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Cites Work

• Fair Groves mechanisms
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• Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
• Fair imposition
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• Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
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• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains