Contests with rank-order spillovers

DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0489-2zbMath1262.91077OpenAlexW2141776157MaRDI QIDQ690686

Dan Kovenock, Casper G. de Vries, Michael R. Baye

Publication date: 28 November 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0489-2

zbMATH Keywords

spilloversauctionscontests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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