Authority and communication in the laboratory
From MaRDI portal
Publication:765215
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.006zbMath1279.91050MaRDI QIDQ765215
Publication date: 19 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.006
delegation; laboratory experiment; level-\(k\) model; cheap-talk communication; decision-making authority
91B44: Economics of information
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
91A90: Experimental studies
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