Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90040-1zbMath0546.90002OpenAlexW1994809105MaRDI QIDQ798550

Norman Schofield

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-163009131

zbMATH Keywords

voting gameNakamura numberinfinitesimal optima, infinitesimal cycles, local cycles, directional corelocal solution conceptssocial equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (19)

Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria ⋮ Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions ⋮ Structural instability of the core ⋮ The ``probability of a fit choice ⋮ On the core of voting games ⋮ The Core of Voting Games: A Partition Approach ⋮ Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model ⋮ A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games ⋮ Smooth social choice ⋮ Bounds for the Nakamura number ⋮ General conditions for the existence of maximal elements via the uncovered set ⋮ Existence of a multicameral core ⋮ Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change ⋮ Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences ⋮ Far-sightedness and the voting paradox ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS ⋮ Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold ⋮ The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results ⋮ The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions

Cites Work

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• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• A generalization of Tychonoff's fixed point theorem
• On the existence of maximal elements
• Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
• Existence of Equilibrium on a Manifold
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Continuous-Valued Binary Decision Procedures
• Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Local Simple Games in Public Choice Mechanisms
• Majority Voting and Social Choice

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