Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory

DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0441-5zbMath1185.91028MaRDI QIDQ847802

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ronald J. A. P. Peeters

Publication date: 19 February 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0441-5

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium; noncooperative game; homotopy; computation of equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A18: Games in extensive form

65H20: Global methods, including homotopy approaches to the numerical solution of nonlinear equations

91A25: Dynamic games

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Uses Software

• HOMPACK

Cites Work

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