Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
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Publication:894041
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.01.012zbMath1330.91029OpenAlexW2067465949MaRDI QIDQ894041
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.012
Related Items (7)
Order of limits in reputations ⋮ Selloffs, bailouts, and feedback: can asset markets inform policy? ⋮ Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device ⋮ A reputation for honesty ⋮ Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts ⋮ Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games ⋮ Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
Cites Work
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- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
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- Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation
- Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
- Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
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