Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
From MaRDI portal
Publication:898674
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.007zbMath1368.91073OpenAlexW1655117327MaRDI QIDQ898674
Josep Freixas, Cameron C. Parker
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/80825
Related Items
On anonymous and weighted voting systems, The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games, The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games, Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power, Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index, Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- The influence relation for ternary voting games
- Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
- Ternary voting games
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
- Mathematics and Politics
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions