Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7zbMath0518.90008OpenAlexW2006690860MaRDI QIDQ1054250

Ariel Rubinstein, Menahem E. Yaari

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddiscountsrepeated insurance contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Related Items (20)

Dynamic moral hazard without commitment ⋮ Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency ⋮ Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting ⋮ Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information ⋮ Dynamic consistency of insurance contracts under enforcement by exclusion ⋮ Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing ⋮ Self-evident events and the value of linking ⋮ Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring ⋮ Asymptotic efficiency in principal-agent models with hidden information ⋮ Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods ⋮ Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. ⋮ Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals ⋮ An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information ⋮ Effective Premium Discrimination for Designing Cyber Insurance Policies with Rare Losses ⋮ Aggregate fluctuations, interest rates, and repeated insurance under private information ⋮ Principal-Agent Models ⋮ Aggregate fluctuations, interest rates, and repeated insurance under private information ⋮ Dynamic contracts with random monitoring ⋮ Internal correlation in repeated games ⋮ The principal-agent problem with adaptive players

Cites Work

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• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Another note on the Borel-Cantelli lemma and the strong law, with the Poisson approximation as a by-product
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• On Moral Hazard and Insurance

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