Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90087-1zbMath0619.90013OpenAlexW2031291216MaRDI QIDQ1090218

Joseph M. Ostroy, Louis Makowski

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp333.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationperfect competitiongame theoretic-mechanismPareto optimal, individually rational, dominant strategy allocation mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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The modified Vickrey double auction, Incentive mechanism design for security investment with local exit equilibrium on structured populations, Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model, On robust constitution design, When Walras meets Vickrey, Analysis of Quantized Double Auctions with Application to Competitive Electricity Markets, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence, Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade, Ascending price Vickrey auctions, The strategy structure of some coalition formation games, Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive, Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior, Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability, The package assignment model.

Cites Work

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