Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90022-7zbMath0751.90094OpenAlexW1965142293MaRDI QIDQ1192628

Thomas R. Palfrey, Howard Rosenthal

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90022-7

zbMATH Keywords

private informationcheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Public goods (91B18) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (13)

Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games ⋮ The circulation of worthless tokens aids cooperation: an experiment inspired by the Kula ⋮ A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk ⋮ Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach ⋮ Communication and visibility in public goods provision ⋮ Output restriction and the ratchet effect: evidence from a real-effort work task ⋮ Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis ⋮ Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication ⋮ Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games ⋮ How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games ⋮ Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes ⋮ Provision of public goods in a large economy ⋮ Should the talk be cheap in contribution games?

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Multistage Games with Communication
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
• Strategic Information Transmission
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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