Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2388zbMath0911.90012OpenAlexW2064233784MaRDI QIDQ1268575

James Bergin, Arunava Sen

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/273386/files/qed_wp_952.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationimplementation of social choice rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization, Efficient investments in the implementation problem, Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies, Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments, A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation, Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough, Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments, Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games

Cites Work

• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Implementation in differential information economies
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
• Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
• Perfect Bayesian implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Bayesian Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem