Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
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Publication:1300208
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2530zbMath0940.91044OpenAlexW3121280891MaRDI QIDQ1300208
Publication date: 10 May 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2530
Related Items (11)
Evolutionary dynamics for the generalized Baliga-Maskin public good model ⋮ Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information ⋮ Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games ⋮ Mechanism design and bounded rationality: the case of type misreporting ⋮ Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ⋮ Continuous approximations of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Economists' models of learning
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