Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00126-XzbMath1064.91039MaRDI QIDQ1429922

Jinwoo Kim, Yeon-Koo Che

Publication date: 27 May 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions ⋮ Private versus complete information in auctions ⋮ Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions. ⋮ Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment ⋮ The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions ⋮ On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Multidimensional private value auctions ⋮ Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: a ``desensitizer from uncertainty ⋮ EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ENGLISH AUCTIONS: ORAL OUTCRY VERSUS CLOCK

Cites Work

• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
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• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Efficient Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• An Efficient Auction