A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
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Publication:1779834
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.003zbMath1118.91040MaRDI QIDQ1779834
Publication date: 1 June 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.003
Maskin monotonicity; Incentive compatibility; Bayesian monotonicity; Type diversity; Virtual monotonicity
91B14: Social choice
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Cites Work
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- Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
