Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions

DOI10.1007/S00182-021-00772-2zbMath1478.91028OpenAlexW3171112699MaRDI QIDQ2051504

Karl H. Schlag, Péter Vida

Publication date: 24 November 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00772-2

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibrialanguagecredibilitycoordinationpre-play communicationvirtual communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
• Communication between rational agents
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Player importance and forward induction
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• A model of pre-game communication
• Credible proposals in communication games
• Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate
• Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and ``weak link coordination games
• Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
• Coordination and learning with a partial language
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Universal grammar

This page was built for publication: Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions