Iterated dominance revisited
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Publication:2059064
DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01275-ZzbMath1479.91054OpenAlexW3082024010MaRDI QIDQ2059064
Amanda Friedenberg, H. Jerome Keisler
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01275-z
rationalizabilityepistemic game theoryiterated dominancetype structuresrationality and common belief of rationality
Related Items (5)
Weak belief and permissibility ⋮ The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces ⋮ Cautious belief and iterated admissibility ⋮ Complete Conditional Type Structures (Extended Abstract) ⋮ Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
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