Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
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Publication:2211468
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105038zbMath1454.91080OpenAlexW3014182614MaRDI QIDQ2211468
Publication date: 11 November 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105038
robust implementationdynamic mechanismsdynamic robust monotonicityweak perfect Bayesian equilibriumweak rationalizability
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