Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude
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Publication:2416657
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.002zbMath1411.91129OpenAlexW2924440667WikidataQ128178623 ScholiaQ128178623MaRDI QIDQ2416657
Publication date: 24 May 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.002
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Cites Work
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