Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange

DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0774-yzbMath1307.91137OpenAlexW2059521128MaRDI QIDQ2447169

Rodrigo A. Velez

Publication date: 24 April 2014

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0774-y

zbMATH Keywords

consistencystrategy-proofnessgroup strategy-proofnessreallocation-proofnessconsistent hierarchical exchange ruleshierarchical exchange rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

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