Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.005zbMath1281.91093MaRDI QIDQ2455672

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=4038&type=WPN

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism design; interdependent valuations; multidimensional types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities, Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems, Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents, Multi-dimensional procurement auction under uncertain and asymmetric information, Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents, Epistemological implementation of social choice functions, Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces, Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders

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