The inverse problem for power distributions in committees
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Publication:2629512
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0946-8zbMath1391.91076arXiv1402.0988MaRDI QIDQ2629512
Publication date: 6 July 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.0988
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