Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
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Publication:3142524
DOI10.2307/2951500zbMath0784.90110OpenAlexW2043087553MaRDI QIDQ3142524
Publication date: 20 December 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/981.pdf
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