Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00080zbMath0947.91054WikidataQ56028807 ScholiaQ56028807MaRDI QIDQ4262865

John Hardman Moore, Oliver D. Hart

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (31)

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