scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038875

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Publication:4449283

zbMath1049.91037MaRDI QIDQ4449283

Donald G. Saari

Publication date: 8 February 2004


Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.



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