Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
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Publication:6107378
DOI10.1007/S00199-022-01422-8zbMath1520.91184OpenAlexW4220714855MaRDI QIDQ6107378
Mariya Teteryatnikova, Anastasia Antsygina
Publication date: 3 July 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01422-8
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (7)
On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals ⋮ Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints ⋮ Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types ⋮ Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences ⋮ Diversification and information in contests ⋮ Perfect robust implementation by private information design ⋮ Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
Cites Work
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- Optimal information exchange in contests
- Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
- Private Bayesian persuasion
- Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
- Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
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