Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
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Publication:6156325
DOI10.1007/s10058-022-00289-4zbMath1515.91106arXiv2009.13104MaRDI QIDQ6156325
Sulagna Dasgupta, Debasis Mishra
Publication date: 13 June 2023
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.13104
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