Assigning agents to a line
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1256696 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1033392 (Why is no real title available?)
- A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Assigning agents to a line
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency (3 volumes)
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Time-shared Systems
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Two special cases of the assignment problem
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
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