Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
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Cites work
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Constrained school choice
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
- Matching markets with mixed ownership: the case for a real-life assignment mechanism
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- School Choice with Consent*
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
Cited in
(19)- Assignment and sequencing models for the scheduling of process systems
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
- Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program
- Gradual college admission
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
- Sequencing Problems in Two-Server Systems
- The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- Dynamically stable matching
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
- Sequential school choice with public and private schools
- Market design with distributional objectives: efficiency, incentives, and property rights
- Gradual matching with affirmative action
- When is a sequential school choice system (non-)deficient?
- Waitlist engineering in discrete object allocations with outside option
- Game-theoretic analysis of decentralized college admissions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
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