Publication:2186810

DOI10.1016/J.JCSS.2020.03.001zbMATH Open1448.91100OpenAlexW3011288705MaRDI QIDQ2186810FDOQ2186810

Ann-Kathrin Selker, Dorothea Baumeister, Olivia J. Erdélyi, Gábor Erdélyi, Jörg Rothe

Publication date: 9 June 2020

Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2020.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitycontroljudgment aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Cites Work

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Cited In (5)

• Parameterized Complexity Results for the Kemeny Rule in Judgment Aggregation
• The possible winner problem with uncertain weights revisited
• Complexity of manipulation and bribery in premise-based judgment aggregation with simple formulas
• The Complexity Landscape of Outcome Determination in Judgment Aggregation
• The possible winner with uncertain weights problem

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