Publication:6565777

DOI10.3982/TE5400MaRDI QIDQ6565777FDOQ6565777

Xu Lang, Debasis Mishra

Publication date: 2 July 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibilityunanimous votingmonotone reduced formreduced-form voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Reduced form auctions revisited
• PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
• The veil of public ignorance
• An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
• Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
• Equitable Voting Rules
• Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications

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