Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation

DOI10.2307/2527106zbMath0742.90090OpenAlexW2051471909MaRDI QIDQ3978158

Ehud Kalai, Chaim Fershtman, Kenneth L. Judd

Publication date: 25 June 1992

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/879.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumstrategic delegationtwo-stage gameCournot-type duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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