Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
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Publication:324173
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.008zbMath1394.91160MaRDI QIDQ324173
Jacob K. Goeree, Alexey Kushnir
Publication date: 10 October 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.008
convex set; social choice; convex analysis; mechanism design; support function; interdependent values; reduced-form implementation
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