On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.010zbMath1297.91084OpenAlexW2131446015MaRDI QIDQ403716

Jeroen M. Swinkels, Vlad Mares

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

differentiationmechanism designasymmetric auctionsprocurementfirst price auctionsrequest for proposalrho-concavitysecond price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release ⋮ Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations ⋮ Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers ⋮ Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders ⋮ Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch ⋮ Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions ⋮ Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions

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