Fixation probabilities of strategies for bimatrix games in finite populations

DOI10.1007/s13235-015-0170-2zbMath1391.91040OpenAlexW1732707482MaRDI QIDQ523440

Hisashi Ohtsuki, Takuya Sekiguchi

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0170-2

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityequilibrium selectionfinite populationbimatrix gamesfixation probabilitystochastic evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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