Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
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Publication:719889
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.008zbMath1236.91080OpenAlexW1972185405MaRDI QIDQ719889
Publication date: 12 October 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/16934/070econDP07-10.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Dynamic multilateral markets, Equality in legislative bargaining, Collective hold‐up, Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games, Coalition formation in games with externalities, Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining, Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences, The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification, Campaigning internally or externally, On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols, A model of pre-electoral coalition formation, A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown, The burning coalition bargaining model
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