Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.003zbMath1330.91163OpenAlexW2132196928WikidataQ113294301 ScholiaQ113294301MaRDI QIDQ894014

Jonathan Newton, Simon D. Angus

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2123/8895

zbMATH Keywords

networksevolutioncoalitionsocial normconservatismreform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

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