Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0217-8zbMath1155.91361OpenAlexW2162271938MaRDI QIDQ1003098

Giuseppe Lopomo, George Sandro Brusco

Publication date: 26 February 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0217-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Pricing in position auctions and online advertising ⋮ Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction ⋮ Introduction to the symposium ⋮ Sequential contests with synergy and budget constraints ⋮ Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization ⋮ Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions ⋮ On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods ⋮ Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints ⋮ Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders ⋮ Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint

Cites Work

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• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities

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