Auctions with costly information acquisition

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0301-0zbMath1155.91363OpenAlexW2126754427MaRDI QIDQ1003100

George Jacques Crémer, Charles Z. Zheng, Yossef Spiegel

Publication date: 26 February 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2385/1/auctions_screen.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (18)

The value of information for auctioneers ⋮ Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation ⋮ Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition ⋮ Second-price auctions with private entry costs ⋮ Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed ⋮ Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment ⋮ Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions ⋮ Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert ⋮ Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces ⋮ Information acquisition during a descending auction ⋮ Introduction to the symposium ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study ⋮ Endogenous information and stochastic contracts ⋮ Prices versus auctions in large markets ⋮ Pessimistic information gathering

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types
• Optimal search auctions
• Participation costs and efficient auctions
• Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Optimal auctions revisited
• Auctions with endogenous entry

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