Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
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Publication:1007769
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.015zbMath1162.91358OpenAlexW2151491611MaRDI QIDQ1007769
Publication date: 24 March 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5173
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (5)
Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Information acquisition in conflicts ⋮ The insider's curse ⋮ Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance ⋮ Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
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