Representations of simple games by social choice functions

DOI10.1007/BF01753237zbMath0391.90007MaRDI QIDQ1251576

Bezalel Peleg

Publication date: 1978

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Choice ProceduresCommitteesSimple GamesSocial Choice Functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (17)

On strong representations of games by social choice functions ⋮ The capacity of a committee ⋮ Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives ⋮ Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters ⋮ On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions ⋮ Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey ⋮ Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules ⋮ A theory of coalition formation in committees ⋮ Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions ⋮ The strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice ⋮ Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory ⋮ Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium ⋮ Weakly implementable social choice rules ⋮ Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form ⋮ The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results

Cites Work

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• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems

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