Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00011-3zbMath1040.91011OpenAlexW2066139966MaRDI QIDQ1399513

Tomas Sjöström, Chen-Ying Huang

Publication date: 30 July 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00011-3

zbMATH Keywords

externalitiesrecursive core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Credible coalitions and the core
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
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