Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00026-5zbMath1089.91007MaRDI QIDQ1408715

William H. Sandholm

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic differential equationequilibriuminexact informationbehavior processlocal probabilistic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic ordinary differential equations (aspects of stochastic analysis) (60H10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (17)

Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs ⋮ A PDE model for protocell evolution and the origin of chromosomes via multilevel selection ⋮ The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: a deterministic approximation approach ⋮ A class of evolutionary models for participation games with negative feedback ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Stable games and their dynamics ⋮ An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Imitation in heterogeneous populations ⋮ The propagation of chaos for interacting individuals in a large population ⋮ The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games ⋮ The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic ⋮ Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case ⋮ Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Pairwise comparison dynamics and evolutionary foundations for Nash equilibrium ⋮ Tributes to Bill Sandholm ⋮ ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game ⋮ Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games

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