Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information.
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Publication:1408715
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00026-5zbMath1089.91007MaRDI QIDQ1408715
Publication date: 25 September 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
stochastic differential equation; equilibrium; inexact information; behavior process; local probabilistic stability
60H10: Stochastic ordinary differential equations (aspects of stochastic analysis)
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91A22: Evolutionary games
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